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Considerable attention has been given to the problem of non-monotonic reasoning in a belief function 
framework. Earlier work (M. Ginsberg) proposed solutions introducing meta-rules which recognized condi­
tional independencies in a probabilistic sense. More recently an e-calculus formulation of default reasoning 
(J. Pearl) shows that the application of Dempster's rule to a non-monotonic situation produces erroneous 
results. This paper presents a new belief function interpretation of the problem which combines the rules in 
a way which is more compatible with probabilistic results and respects conditions of independence necessary 
for the application of Dempster's combination rule. A new general framework for combining conflicting evi­
dence is also proposed in which the normalization factor becomes modified. This produces more intuitively 
acceptable results. 
1. Introduction 
In commonsense reasoning, it is often the case that one wishes to draw 'typically' information from a fact 
such as 'usually all A's are B's' or most A's are B's. As some exceptions to these rules do exist, they may 
be at best taken to be 'default' rules [ 11,21] or assumptions. Under the default assumption, the rules are 
considered to be true until this belief needs to be revised due to the arrival of contradictory pieces of evidence 
(such as A is definitely not B, for some A.) Hence the inherently non-monotonic nature of default reasoning 
systems. In the original scheme proposed by Reiter, no use is made of multi valued logic, probability theory 
or any (quasi) numeric form of uncertainty. Many recent papers have appeared (8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16) to 
name but a few discussing the problem in a variety of these frameworks. 
The problem of conflicting evidence and non-monotonicity in the Dempster-Shafer model of beliefs has 
been a topic of considerable discussion and concern in recent years. Authors such as Ginsberg [8,9], Dubois 
and Prade [6,7], Zadeh [25,26] and Henkind [13] have written a number of articles on the subject. Recently 
J. Pearl [19,20] has written articles showing presumably unresolvable difficulties with belief function theory 
in handling such problems. 
This paper examines the issue again and offers new solutions. It begins by re-evaluating work by J. Pearl 
and a particular problem in non-monotonic reasoning discussed in the context of an e-calculus definition of 
default logic. When examining this in more detail, the results are shown not to be not as counter-intuitive 
as indicated in [19] given the assumptions made. A new model is presented which overcomes many 
of the objections found in the earlier work. Although evidence is actually combined, the results are 
not inconsistent with the views of Ginsberg [9]. This model is related to recent work by Dubois and Prade 
[6] on interpretations of dependent rules, but, in fact, is not equivalent to it. This result is then extended to 
provide a more general solution to problems of non-monotonicity and conflicting evidence in belief function 
theory. In this new framework, the often disagreeable affect of the normalizing constant in situations of 
conflict is overcome. 
Section 1.1 provides a brief review of basic definitions. Section 2 looks in detail at the problem of evidence 
combination for a classical example of non-monotonic reasoning. Section 3 extends these results to more 
1Thia work has been aupported by NSERC operating grant #A4515. 
519 
general problems of conflicting evidence and Section 4 concludes the paper. 
§1.1 Definitions 
A b1ief 1eview of a few common terms used in belief function theory are presented. [See also 4,5,22). 
(1) frame of discernment, 8, which consists of a finite set of hypotheses assumed to be mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive. 
(2) a function m: 29-+ [0, 1], called a basic probability a11ignment if whenever m(0) = 0 and L:yc9 m(Y) = 
1. The quantity m(A) is a measure of belief committed exactly to A, where A � 9, w"hereas the 
quantity m(9) is a measure of belief that remains unassigned after commitment of belief to various 
subsets of 9. 
{3) A function Bel: 29-+ [0, 1]; called a belief function if 
(i) Be/(0) = 0, (ii) Bel(6) = 1 
(iii) Bel(A) = 2:B�.A m(B), for all A s; 8. 
(4) Plau.aibility of A= 1- Bel(Ac), where c stands for complement. The interval [Bel(A), Pl(A)] is called 
the belief interval. 
(5) Suppose m1 and m2 are basic probability assignments over a frame of discernment 8, then their orthogonal 
sum m1 ® ma is defined by 
m(0) :: 0, m(X) :: x-1 
where K = 1- E{i,;;.A,nB,;=I} m1(A,)m2(B;). 
Here m = m1 ® m2 and X, A, B are subsets of (}. K is called the normalizing con8tant. This is 
Dempster's Combination rule. 
A Review of Default Reasoning using an e-calculus approach 
The £-calculus formulation in [19] presents a way in which to capture the essence of statements like "almost 
all A's are B's" by interpreting these sentences in the terms of extreme conditional probabilities, infinitesi­
mally distant from 0 or 1. For example, the sentence almost every bird flies becomes P(Fly(:c)/Bird(:z:)) � 
1- E, where E > 0 is a quantity that can be made infinitesimally small. A default theory T =< F, 1::::.. >con­
tains factual sentences F and default statements 1::::..  The notion of a plausible conclusion of a theory is given 
as follows: let A�:= {P(qfp) � 1- E: p-+ qeA}. Then r is a plausible conclusion ofT if P(r/ F)� 1- O(E) 
where O(E) represents a function of E which approaches 0 as E -+ 0. A full theory is developed tying the 
E-theory together with the work of E. Adams on the Logic of Conditionals. 
Pearl examines the results of the analysis of the example of drawing a plausible conclusion from: 
6. = {Penguin-+ Fly, Bird-+ Fly, and Penguin-+ Bird}, 
and F = {Penguin(Tweety), Bird(Tweety)} 
If !::., = {P(f fb) � 1 - E, P(f fp) � E and P(bfp) � 1 - E} it is shown in [19], following the usual rules 
of probability that P(fjp,b) $ O(E) or equivalently that P(- ffp,b) � 1- O(E), where O(E) = 1:�. Thus, 
Tweety does not fly is a plausible conclusion of the theory. This interpretation of the classical example allows 
for bird -+ fly and penguin -+'"'"' fly to both hold - permitting non-monotonicity. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
520 
§2 A New Belief Function Interpretation of a Classical Example from non­
monotonic Reasoning 
2.1 Initial Comments and Comparison with Conditional Probabilities 
A number of observations are made by J. Pearl in [19] concerning the use of Dempster-Shafer theory for 
conflicting pieces of evidence. This section provides a more complete analysis of the use of Dempster-Shafer 
theory for the classic example from non-monotonic reasoning concerning 'Birds normally fly'. 
The discussion given in [19], begins with the following belief assignments: 
m1 : p -+ ...... f, "Penguins don't normally fly" rule 1 
m2 : b-+ f, "Birds normally fly" rule 2 
m3 : p -+ b, "Penguins are birds" rule 3 
where m1 = 1- £1, m2 = 1- E2 and 1- £1 and £2 are small positive quantities and m3 = 1. If one wishes 
to compute P(f fp, b) using conditional probabilities, it is noted that the entailment p -+ b implies that 
P(f fp, b) = P(f fp) = 1- P(- f fp) = 1- m1 = E1. However, using D-S belief function theory the result 
becomes 
Bel{Fly) = et-hh e1+ea-E1f2 
or approximately -..!1...._ , E1 ;!:ta 
The material in [19] goes on to express a number of concerns about this result. This first part of section 
argues that the real problem concerns the lack of independence between the two pieces of evidence used. 
The second part of section 4 considers the 'bird flying' example analyzed in [19), redoing the D-S analysis 
to combine the evidence more correctly. 
The conditional probability model recognizes that P(p and b) = P(p) when writing P( ...... f fp, b) = P(""' 
f fp) in the 'bird' example just stated at the beginning of the section. However, the D-S formulation assumes 
one is combining two pieces of independent information {which is dearly not the case here). Looking at 
the problem of combining pieces of confirming and disconfirming evidence under a conditional independence 
assumption, we have P{e1 and e:�/H) = P(e1fH)P(e:�/H), from which P(Hfe1 and e2) = P(Hte;.l��H/ea) 
by Bayes' rule and independence of e1 and e2• 
Assuming P(H/e1) = E1 and P(H/e:�) = 1- E2, 
h P(H/ d ) e1(l-ea) we ave e1 an e2 = P(H) 
and P(- H/e1 and e:�) = <.J,(�1W 
In the D-S model, Bel(H) given the same two pieces of evidence is e1(;ea) and Bel(- H) is ••<)tll, 
where K = 1- Bel(¢)= E1 + E2 - E1E2. 
Unlike the probability model, Bel(H) and Bel(- H) do not need to sum to 1, although they almost do here 
as Bel(¢) = � is the only other non-zero belief. 
If one examines these expressions, in the D-S setting it was considered paradoxical in [19] that Bel(H) -+ 1 
if E2 -+ O, independently of E1. In the example it was applied to there it is more likely that £1 will be 
smaller than E:t. If £1 = £�1 for example (there are a lot fewer flying penguins than there are non-flying 
birds), Bel(H) = 1�· •• = E21 a small quantity. If E2 -+ 0, then there are really no non-flying birds, which 
include penguins and it does not really seem surprising that Bel(H) -+ 1. The two pieces of evidence, 
(although treated independently) are in fact not. At least in the interpretation stage this 
should be remembered, if not earlier as discussed in the next section. 
If £1 = £2 = £2, Bel( H) = 1/2. In this situation, the evidence for and against the hypothesis are equally 
balanced and the belief becomes �:: or approximately 1/2. This result is similar to what would be obtained 
from a MYCIN certainty factor model[2]. Otherwise if the epsilon's are not equal it is the relative size of e-1 
and £2 that is important. If e-1 < E2 (there is stronger disconfirming evidence), Bel( H) < 1/2 and visa versa 
otherwise - all of which is quite reasonable if it is assumed that we are considering two independent pieces 
of evidence when doing the combination. 
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When considering the probability model, P(H/e1 and e2) can become large if the prior was small and 
vice versa for P(- H/e1 and e2)· Thus the evidence which is very different from the prior has the stronger 
effect on the combined conditional probability. Under the independence assumption, P(Hje1 and e2) is 
certainly not E1. It is the expressions with the same numerator as the D-S expressions but different denom­
inators which should be compared. The paper(17] by this author discusses the conditions for the equality of 
these two expressions in some detail. 
2.2 The Problem of Choosing a Frame of Discernment 
This section suggests a way of looking at Dempster-Shafer theory which more closely resembles the 
probabilistic result and captures the fact that penguins form a sub-class of birds. In fact there is inherently 
a problem with the translation of the problem to the D-S model in any case, as the outcome spaces are not 
the same. That is the value m1 has been obtained as a measure over the outcome (event) space of flying and 
non-flying penguins, whereas m2 is over the space of all birds. One is then asked to combine evidence about 
events where the measure of belief has been originally assumed to be spread over these different spaces. One 
then really assumes (in what has been done in [19]) that the value pertaining to the set of all birds also 
pertains to the penguin outcome space and then the evidence is combined over that space. The measure 1-e2 
is assigned to Bel(penguins fly) and it is not too surprising to discover that Bel(fly) tends to 1 if e2 goes to 
zero. This is actually similar to doing a Dempster conditioning (see [24]) on the space of birds (conditioning 
on penguins). If the belief is viewed as coining in any way from statistical evidence, the conditioning or 
inheritance is quite invalid. Any statistical evidence about birds flying in general implies nothing about the 
frequency with which penguins fly. Even if one takes a subjective view of belief, it is still unclear that this 
conditioning makes sense. (More will be said about this later.) 
In any case, if the conditioning is carried out, one obtains for the same evidence, two different mass 
functions. One can hardly agree to combine them as if coming from independent pieces of evidence - at least 
not in the simple interpretation of the rules as evidence -+ outcome. 
The non-monotonic problem has been studied and some resolutions have been proposed by other authors, 
although these suggestions have not been considered in [19]. In particular, Ginsberg [9] introduces metarules 
such as "never apply a rule to a set when there is a corresponding rule which can be applied to a subset". 
This would imply we should find the same result as for conditional probabilities, that is, only use the rule 
about penguins and find the belief that they fly is :S e1 (assulning Bel( doesn't fly) is 1- e1 and m(8) = e1 ) . 
However, if one wishes to have a framework in which to capture both pieces of knowledge and with which 
to reason about future information about, perhaps, non-penguins and penguins, a way can be found to 
incorporate the new evidence about penguins. Bhatnagar and Ka.nal (1] have noted similar problems when 
they say that "updating of the m values in the light of new evidence poses another problem •.. the new 
evidence may require creation or deletion of focal elements or readjustment of m values for the same core of 
evidence." In the problem being studied, the evidence for the class of penguins may be considered as new 
evidence from the original evidence about birds in general. In another sense, the problem is that the frame 
of discernment has now changed. As noted by the same authors in [1], "another constraint that exists for 
Dempster's rule is that the two frames must be identical ... a body of evidence for a given world model may 
consist of a number of frames of discernment ... combination of such bodies of evidence is an interesting and 
complex problem". 
2.8 Solution to the Frame Problem. 
The simple frame of discernment chosen as 'flies', 'not ilies' in [19] is a very coarse frame. The question is 
'what' flies or what is the variable q whose possible values q represents? In one case, it seems to be penguins 
and for the other rule it is birds. 
This paper will consider a way to produce a measure m and corresponding belief function over an ap-
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propriate frame of discernment which allows the two rules to be expressed by one function. If another rule 
is added to the system which is independent from the others and can be expressed over the same frame of 
discernment, it may be combined with this function in the usual manner for D-S theory. 
The New Frame of Discernment: The natural frame of discernment here is the set of all birds, classed 
in two groups, flying birds and non-flying birds. This is essentially that used by Pearl in [19]. However to 
make the rule about penguins fit into the model, this frame needs to be refined. Recall from [22] that a 
refinement occurs when one frame of discernment 0, is obtained from another frame 0 by splitting some 
or all of the elements of 0. Let w({8}) represent those possibilities into which 8 has been split. The sets 
w( {8}) must constitute a disjoint partition of 0. Here we will split flying and non-flying birds as follows: 
w(fb) {flying penguins, other species of flying birds} 
w(nfb) = {non-flying penguins, other species of non-flying birds} 
(Note, the 'other species' may be itemized or grouped). Then 0 = {fp, nfp, ofb, onfb} is a refinement of 
8 = {fb, nfb}, where for example, ofb stands for other flying birds. 
Suppose we are given a belief function Belo on 211• Then this is consistent with a belief function Bel 
on 2° if Belo(A) = Bel( w(A)) for all A E 211• In our case, we are given a belief function on 211 by rule 2; 
specifically m{fb) = 1- E21 m(9) = E2. If we let Bel{fp, ofb} = 1- e2, we will have a consistent belief 
function on 2°. 
The problem then becomes how to interpret rule 1 in this refined frame. The following Theorem provides 
a solution. 
Combination of Evidence 
Theorem 1. If a refined frame 0 = {fp, nfp, ofb, onfb} replaces the coarser frame (which was essentially 
{flies, ....., flies}), and new mass functions are appropriately specified, Dempster rule of combination of the two 
interpreted rules results in a new belief function Bel' with the following properties: 
bel'{fp, ofb} = 1- E2, the belief interval for {fp} is [0, 1- Bel'{fp}c] = [0, e1]. 
Proof 
Consider the following table, using the usual Dempster rule of combination. 
{fp}c1- E1 Oe1 
{fp, ofb }1 - E2 (1 - Et){1 - E2) : { ofb} E1(1 - E2) : {fp, ofb} 
This results in a new belief function, say Bel', where Bel'{fp, ofb} = Et(1-e2)+(1-e1)(1-e2) = 1-e2, which 
agrees with Bel on 0. There is no mass on {fp }. However the belief interval is [0, 1 - Bel' {fp }c] = [0, e1]. 
This is consistent with the model of conditional probabilities. We see that the belief interval for { ofb} 
becomes [(1-e1)(1-e2), 1], which is reasonable. The belief in {fp}c becomes 1-e1, as before. This is really 
the belief that other birds fly. We cannot expect to obtain a mass on {fp} alone as the evidence in the rule 
was originally given only in terms of not flying. Strictly speaking, we are not allowed to assume this implies 
m(fp) = e1 in the D-S model. Bel' is then a new belief function which combines 'both rules and maintains 
their separate validity. 
Note: Many of the ideas in the first part of this paper have been expressed initially in the paper by McLeish 
[18]. 
Another way to word the members of the frame of discernment 0 would be as: 
{penguins fly, other birds fly, ... other hypotheses}. 
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This interpretation then makes the belief (1- e1)(1 - E2) obtained for other flying birds more meaningful 
as the belief that other birds (not penguins) do fl.y. To use the new belief function, if one is given only the 
evidence bird and wishes to know the belief that birds fly, one considers Bel' {/p, o fb} and if the evidence is 
penguins the subsets involving penguins apply. 
It is very important to recognize that several transformations have taken place. 
(1) A refinement of the frame (which is necessary to house both rules regardless if one is considering beliefs 
as being obtained subjectively or statistically). See also Shafer [23], who mentions the possible need 
of a refined frame for this problem. 
(2) The information has been translated into a form where we consider that we have two independent pieces 
of evidence: e1 which says the belief that penguins don't fly is 1- e1 and e2, which says that the belief 
birds fly is 1 - E1. That is, some evidence has been obtained to substantiate the outcome "birds fly" 
and some "other" evidence has been used to discover the information about penguins. For example, 
the evidence could come from observing groups of birds and then a collection of penguins - or just from 
someone telling you their subjective opinion. (Even if it is coming from the same individual, their way 
of arriving at both the outcomes might well be different.) 
If the evidence is the same, for example, if one observes a population of birds and uses the same 
distribution for penguins, again the evidence should not be combined. 
(3) If you wish to combine further new evidence, such as penguins fly with belief .2, you simply use Demp­
ster's rule with m(O) = .8, m(pf) = .2 and the table in Theorem 1. One obtains a belief that birds 
fly of ·�!:;::> ::::! (1 - e2), but is very slightly smaller. The belief that penguins fly becomes .s���-1 or 
slightly more than 0. These are the results of combining all three rules and are not unreasonable. 
Comments on the Chosen Frame and Rule Interpretations 
(1) Relationship to the Work of Dubois and Prade [7J. 
In a recent paper by Dubois and Prade [6], a method is proposed to handle possibly dependent rules of 
the form: 
If 111 E B1, then :z: E A1 
If 112 E B2, then :z: E A2, where :z: is a variable ranging on 0 and B1 � V1, B2 � V2. 
The Cartesian product V x 0 becomes the space over which mass assignments are made (i.e., the frame 
of discernment). If a is understood to be the strength of the rule, then the mass function assigned is 
m(B x Ac)" = a and m(V x 0) = 1- a. However in order to pursue this further for the problem being 
studied, one would already need to assume rule 1 was given in the form, penguins fly with strength E11 so 
that A1 n A2 :f. 0; that is the two rules must both pertain to flying. Some results for handling the situation 
are given when the rules are certain. When they are uncertain and there is dependence, they state that "the 
use of Dempster rule for combining the rules pertaining to A1 and A2 is forbidden". Again (as in Ginsberg 
[8]) neglecting a rule is suggested as a remedy in some situations. 
However, the interpretation used in Theorem 1 can be viewed at least partially in the context of the 
approach in [7]. We let V1 = V2 =all birds and 0 is flies, not flies. Rule 1 has B =penguins, A= doesn't fly 
and (B x A c)" is then (/p)C. which has mass l-e1, m(V x 0) = e1• This interpretation of a negative statement 
agrees with examples in (2] and (22) (where evidence against a hypothesis is put on the complement of the 
hypothesis). It also obeys a principle of minimum specificity (see [7] etc.). The second rule isn't modeled by 
this method and indeed violates A1 n A2 :f. 0 (A1 = doesn't fly, A2 = fiy ). This rule is translated directly as 
m(B x A)= 1 - e2 and not as (B x Ac)e. More specific information is used. 
{2) A comment on the interpretation of the rules: 
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The interpretation of p -- /(1 - e1) as m((pf)c) = 1- E1 is standard for the interpretation of negative 
evidence in Dempster-Shafer Theory (2,22]. For the information b- f, suppose one wanted to examine a 
strict logic interpretation; ....., b V f. For a start, these events are not mutually exclusive. It would make sense 
then to consider a mass on (- b V fb). If this is assigned the value 1- E2, what does this mean? Does it 
mean usually one can't tell the difference between a flying bird and a non-bird, but the outcome is likely one 
or the other. Is this really what the rule is saying? It's more likely saying that Bel{,.... b V fb} is 1- E2 and 
m{fb) = 1- e2• (There is really no evidence to support "'b). Usually positive evidence for an outcome is 
treated as simply putting the mass on that outcome - not as putting some mass on the possibility that the 
evidence is negative. In a probabilistic interpretation, p(f fb) and not p("' b V f) is used to model b - f (the 
two will be the same if p(....., b) is assumed to be zero). If one does obtain later information about whether or 
not non-birds fly, then n could be expanded to include these hypotheses and the masses over the enlarged 
frame would need to be readjusted. In the framework of Theorem 1, m{- b, ofb, fp} = 1- E2i the belief in 
fp is unchanged and the masses on other sets are the same with these sets modified to include -b. 
(3) Further Comments on Conditioning 
If any combination of evidence is to be done at all for the problem, as mentioned before the frames need 
to be merged. One way is to downward condition (as mentioned earlier) and this is effectively what has 
been done by J. Pearl in (19]. The other is to refine the space of birds to include penguins. However then 
the rule about penguins becomes interpreted in a less specific fashion when the information must be spread 
over a larger frame. If you combine the evidence in the larger frame and then attempt to condition down 
again to the smaller one, the same results are obtained as if one first conditioned downwards from the larger 
frame and then combined the evidence. Thus one either accepts or rejects the concept of conditioning the 
information about birds on the subspace, penguins - whenever it is carried out is immaterial. 
As mentioned earlier, if one takes a more frequentist (random set) interpretation of belief functions, the 
Dempster conditioning is not justified in this situation. However one could argue that in the interpretation 
used here for the rules, it is not justified either. For one thing, knowing you are considering penguins doesn't 
provide a rule about whether they fly. (We are assuming we have evidence, say e, which supports rules about 
whether or not birds or penguins fly.) The fact that you are considering penguins does not provide such a 
rule. Knowing you have a penguin, over the original space {penguin's fly, penguin's don't fly} would give 
you a vacuous belief function (m(O) = 1). Over the larger frame it should also. If you say something else, 
like m{penguin's fly, penguin's don't fly} = 1, and m(A) = 0 for all remaining sets, then this is actually 
saying there is evidence that would support penguins flying and evidence to support that they don't and its 
never possible to distinguish non-flying from flying but they all do one or the other. This in fact contradicts 
the first rule. It's also saying the evidence indicates there is no possibility that other birds fly. Actually the 
fact that one is interested in penguins says nothing about whether other birds fly - and so it is really only 
the vacuous belief function which makes sense. 
One might wish instead to assign a belief of 1 to {fp,"' fp}. This still has the problem that it is saying 
that you have no belief that other birds fly. However, if you take this and condition on beliefs alone (not 
masses), the result of Theorem 1 will be that penguins don't fly will be 1 - e1 and that they do will remain 
zero. 
Discussion of Other Interpretations 
If one is allowed to assume from rule 1 that m(fp) = E11 we obtain a situation much like that of the 
cabbage seed discussed by Shafer in Example 4.2 (22] . Here one piece of evidence supports the hypothesis that 
a plant is a cabbage and another that it is actually a dictotyledon. Cabbages are a subset of dictotyledons. 
If A = {cabbage}, B = {dictotyledons} and 0 is the set of species of plants, one obtains Bel(A) = S1, 
Bel(B) = 1- (1- S1)(1- S2), where S1 and S2 are the.supports on A and B initially and Bel represents 
the result of forming the orthogonal sum. 
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In our example, if m1{fp) = e1 and m2{fb) = 1- e2 over the frame of all birds one obtains Bel(fp) = £11 
Bel(fb) = 1- e2 + e1e2• This maintains the value of Bel(fp) , but increases the value of Bel(fb) . The 
assumption about rule 1 necessary to make this interpretation may not be considered valid because it is 
taking a probabilistic view of negation. However, it is mentioned to indicate that there are examples of 
subclasses which are discussed by Shafer in [22]. 
Yet one more interpretation might be considered. Suppose we assign m{nfp} = 1- e1 and m(O) = e1 
for rule 1. Then we obtain Bel{ nfp} � �1 ';.�2, which approaches 1 as e1 - 0, as expected. There is no 
information about the subset flying penguins alone (Bel{fp} = 0). Bel(birds fly)� E1�E2 - 1 as e,- 0 as 
expected. This result could be thought of as a type of partial conditioning, where m{fp)e, conditioned on 
penguin, becomes m{nfp} = 1-e1. But m(O) remains as e1. It is interesting to note that �1".::�2 $ 1- e2 
and � $ 1-e1• Thus, the strength of the rules has been modified slightly in the combination process. 
(Actu�ly the modification could be significant; if e1 == e2 for example, these expressions become 1/2). These 
expressions (as examined earlier in the paper) are very sensitive to the relative size of the epsilons. 
Of all the above, methods presented in Theorem 1 and its discussion are consistent with an example in [2] 
of conflicting evidence where the opposite of a value is interpreted as the complement of the set representing 
it. It produces a new belief function which is really a redefinition of the two separate ones over a refined 
frame of discernment. 
§3. Extension to Other Problems of Conflicting Evidence 
This section considers some simple situations involving conflicting rules (or a default rule contradicted 
by a new rule). The method for processing such a system of rules proceeds in two steps. The first step 
incorporates the rules under one frame of discernment. The second step recombines this resulting evidence 
in coarser frame. The first process is similar to what has been done in Section 2. However the rules used 
there had the added problem that one piece of evidence was a subclass of the other and they were not 
independent. Here we assume we don't have any additional information about how the pieces of evidence 
might be related. If we suppose that we have to rules of the following form: 
a1 - b(1- e1) 
a2 _ ...... b(1-e2) 
We might also suppose that a1 - b is a default rule and that later a new piece of evidence a2 is found which 
implies a contradiction to this. 
Theorem 2. Using an interpretation of rules as described in Section 2 where the frame of discernment 
n becomes the product space {(a1, b), (a1, '""" b) , (a,, b), (a2,- b)}, the following results are obtained after 
performing Dempster's combination rule: 
1) The belief interval for {(a1, b)}== [1-e1, 1] 
2) The belief interval for {(a2, b)} = (0, e1e2] 
Proof: 
The combination table is slightly different from that obtained in Theorem 1 because penguins were a 
subclass of birds. Now the following table results: 
{a2, bY(1- e2) 
0E1 E1 1- E2 : a1, a1, ""' 
{a1, b}l- e1 1-e1 1- e, : a1, b }  
From this the belief interv s can be found. 
If the belief functions are taken from the table of Theorem 2 and used as mass functions for the cases b 
and "" b separately, one obtains the following theorem: 
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Theorem S. If the results from the joined (product) space are now used individually to find a truly 
combined belief in b, the results become: 
(1) Bel{b} = le;e!:::e,. = O(e). 
(2) Bel{bY = 1.;;:�::e,. = 1- O(e), 
where e stands for any function of e1, E2 which goes to zero as E11 E2 -+ 0. 
Proof: Now the mass functions to be combined are: Bel'{(a2, b)}c = ml{bY = 1- E1E21 m1(0) = E1E21 and 
Bel'{(a1, b)}= m2{b} = 1- e1, m2(0) = E1. The resulting m1 ® m2 = m' becomes: 
m'{bY = (1- E1E2)E11 m'(B) = eie2, 
m'{0} = (1- E1E2){1- el}, m'{b} = {1- E1){E1E2)· 
After normalizing one obtains the stated results. 
Corollary 3: 
If the prior probability of b is non-infinitesimal, then the above result for Bel{b} from Theorem 3 is consistent 
with the probabilistic result. 
Proof: P(bla1 and a2) = 42�(�)1) = O(e) if P(b) � e2. Indeed, if P(b) is taken as the value from the first 
piece of evidence and we are updating, P{bla1 and a2) = e2. If P(b) is unknown and is assumed to be 1/2, 
P(bla1 and a2) is again O(e). 
Discussion of Theorem 3 
The pre-step of combining evidence but carrying the evidence as part of the belief function results in a 
new function with opposing views contained within it. It can still be difficult to determine the net effect 
on the outcome b, especially if one piece of evidence is not considered more important than the other. If a 
combination of the only defined mass functions is then made, results are obtained which are different from 
simply combining the evidence directly as in J. Pearl. (Recall that these results would give Bel{b} � e e_;e,. 
and Bel{b}c � 41�42 ) . They are instead consistent (of same order) with the probabilistic interpretations 
given in Pearl[19] and discussed earlier in this paper. 
The method actually involves using one frame of reference to translate the uncertain rules to beliefs under 
a hypothesis of maximizing imprecision and avoiding arbitrariness. This step puts the two rules under one 
frame of reference and yet maintains their separate identities within this frame. Only two non-zero beliefs 
result in this frame and they are opposing as they were to begin with. One subtle change has taken place 
however, which has a small and yet crucial algebraic effect on the normalizing constant when the coarser 
frame is used to re-combine (really combine) the evidence. 
In the example of Section 2, there is an overlap between pieces of evidence. The set {fp, ofb} appears 
instead of just {ofb}. (This would be like using {(a1, b), (a2, b)} instead of just {(at, b)} on the left header 
side of the table in Theorem 3.) If the set { o fb} is used initially with mass function value 1- e2 in Theorem 1 
and then the method of Theorem 3 is applied, the results will be as they already are in Theorem 1. Another 
possibility is to use the belief in {fp} and mass on {fp, ofb} (not including the mass on {ofb} separately). 
These are really the opposing sets. In this case this case the belief in {fp} becomes 0( e) and in {fp y is of 
order 1 - O(e). 
§4.3 Conclusions 
Methods of obtaining composite belief functions which provide reasonable results consistent with those 
found using conditional probability theory have been presented for a problem in non-monotonic reasoning. In 
[19] , it is stated that in D-S theory there is the 'unacceptable phenomenon that rule r3, stating that penguins 
are a subclass of birds, plays no role in the analysis'. This section has argued that unless this information 
527 
does play a role, the assumptions of the Dempster�Shafer model are not being met and the information is 
being improperly combined. The problem is handled by choosing a refinement of the frame of discernment 
which includes the smaller class explicitly. Then a belief function, which is consistent with the coarser frame, 
is assigned to the finer one. Finally the rule about the subset is incorporated into the refined frame. The 
combination of the two resulting functions using the usual Dempster rule produces one new function with 
belief intervals which are intuitively reasonable and more equivalent to the laws of conditional probability. 
This provides a way to represent non�monotonicity of this type and achieve acceptable results. Section 3 has 
shown a way to interpret and combine conflicting rules in a belief function framework. The results found 
are more consistent with those of probability theory. Problems often caused by the normalizing constant do 
not arise when the methods of Section 3 are employed. 
Having said the above, one must still not forget that if the aim is to model the thinking processes of 
humans, then the belief that penguins fly could well be modified by the knowledge about birds. It is likely 
that this modification would be small and more consistent with the interpretation given at the end of the 
discussion to Theorem 3, where Bel{fp} becomes O(e) and Bel{fPY is 1- O(E), than with accepting a full 
conditioning of the belief that birds fly down to the space of penguins. 
The methods described in this paper illustrate several comments appearing in (22] by Shafer. To quote, 
"the frame of discernment most appropriate to a particular instance of probable reasoning 
cannot, then, be determined by a priori considerations; it depends on what evidence is avail­
able. Notice too, that we will tend to enlarge our frame as more evidence becomes available." 
He continues to note that "the construction of a frame of discernment is a creative act and we 
choose among frames of discernment by asking not which is truer but which is more useful. 
Furthermore, the translation of our vague knowledge into degrees of support within our frame 
of discernment can be a challenge to the judgement of our astutest minds". These old, but pos� 
sibly somewhat forgotten comments, I feel are extremely important. Although Dempster's combination rule 
is fixed, varying the other factors (frame and degrees of support) can greatly alter the results. Providing hard 
and fast rules for the latter can be dangerous and at best based on assumptions of no absolute validity. This 
paper has attempted to illustrate these quotes by studying some classical 'bete's noires' of belief function 
theor and showin how more 'useful' and/or 'intuitive' results can be obtained. However the efficacy of 
even these suggestions depends largely on t e spec1 cs of t e application at and. 
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